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It is a privilege that some of the most promising contributors to public health ethics took the time to think and comment on my op-ed. Kristin Voigt’s (1), Emma Tieffenbach’s (2), 
and Yashar Saghai’s (3) ingenious comments have taught me 
a lot about nudging, embarrassment, and restriction. Let me 
address their main points one by one.
Kristin Voigt makes two points. One is that nudging by 
shaming can be either paternalistic or non-paternalistic and 
that, like any intervention, it is easier to justify when it is non-
paternalistic. Indeed, whereas nudges were originally conceived 
as “libertarian paternalistic” and used behavioral psychology to 
promote paternalistic goals only (4,5), nudges (6) and behavior 
psychology in general (7,8) can promote non-paternalistic goals 
as well. What is less obvious is that a paternalistic intervention 
is always harder to justify than a similar non-paternalistic one. 
Sarah Conly writes, “If it is permissible, even obligatory, to stop 
me when I do something that seriously interferes with someone 
else’s chances of achieving the life he wants, I think it is equally 
permissible, and perhaps obligatory, to save me from myself ” 
(7). In fact, is not it easier to justify forcing a child to eat her 
broccoli for her own sake than for her sister’s sake—say, when 
her young sister looks up to her example? And isn’t forcing 
a Jehovah’s Witness to accept blood transfusion against his 
religious edicts easier to justify when the goal is paternalistic, 
to save his life—than when the goal is to save the lives of his 
starving related dependents?
Voigt’s other comment is that there are two quite different routes 
through which zoning laws can shame or stigmatize smokers 
into quitting: directly, by temporarily shunning them from a 
certain geographical zone, and indirectly, by denormalizing 
smoking and provoking many instances of grass root social 
disapproval of smoking and of smokers. She says correctly that I 
was focusing on the first route and warns that the second, more 
dangerous route is a real potential. 
In Voigt’s second route, the intention to induce shame and stigma 
will typically be more transparent. That may weaken its impact 
on shame and stigma: “an expression of contempt may induce 
shame if seen as spontaneous but cause anger if seen as intended 
to induce shame” (8). Even if denormalizing turns out to be 
efficacious, it would be responsible both for making smokers’ 
social lives harder in one respect and for a lot of quitting and a lot 
of smoking-prevention. So long as any resulting social penalties 
for smokers remain by and large moderate, denormalizing 
smoking would usually remain justified on balance. In every 
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society, some behaviors are considered abnormal. Saving scores 
of lives is almost always worth the social risks and harms from 
limited added stigma, lamentable as the latter may be otherwise. 
Emma Tieffenbach points out that shame can be subjectively 
painful (it can be “felt as dread”) and lead to destructive 
reactions like extreme anger. She concludes that shaming is not 
nudging: the latter is supposed to be costless.
Our preference for averting specific embarrassments of the form 
in which I am interested is adaptive (9). Once frustrated, that 
preference quickly wanes in strength, such that over our lifetimes, 
the overall hedonic loss from its frustration—the subjective 
cost—remains small. As an illustration, consider a person who 
is lonely because she moved to a new city but is too embarrassed 
to strike conversation with strangers. If somehow she found 
herself in conversation, the experience could be positive. Strong 
aversion to initiating conversations will have preceded the event. 
But if the embarrassment she dreaded materializes, it would not 
translate into a lasting strong unpleasant sensation—dreaded 
as it may have been. Such a person’s form of embarrassment 
sharply contrasts with the lasting, deep shame and humiliation 
that can haunt victims of torture decades after physical pain 
is past (10). I believe that the embarrassment from not being 
permitted to smoke on the premises is a form of embarrassment 
(not deep shame) that worries us and may make smoking-
avoidance significantly likelier but that when it materializes, 
it rarely feels lastingly dreadful. Sunstein recently emphasized 
that what scares us and we are willing to pay plenty to avoid 
is not necessarily a very bad prospect (11). My proposal is to 
focus on a form of embarrassment that, thanks to our adaptive 
preferences, is not a very bad prospect. 
Moreover, consider again the person who dreads conversation 
with strangers. If she were interviewed on whether a third party 
is promoting his own good by choosing loneliness over starting a 
conversation, she may well judge that lasting loneliness is worse 
than fleeting embarrassment. If asked to list the components of 
the good life, she is likelier to include on the list having friends 
than to include avoiding small embarrassments like starting a 
conversation. In a reflective moment, she may recognize that 
the dreaded embarrassment in fact is about a trifle; the sort 
of realization that can drive cognitive-behavioral therapy. Her 
strong (ex ante) preference to avoid embarrassment lacks her 
own endorsement (12). I believe that the same could be said 
about the embarrassment of, e.g. returning for many refills of 
one’s soda cup, the example to which Tieffenbach reacts. These 
embarrassments are far less morally concerning than the obesity 
epidemic that they may help combat.
It is true that sometimes, people systematically underestimate 
in advance the toll of stigma and shame on them. According to 
some reports (13), many Iranian kidney sellers experience far 
more stigma than anyone could have predicted. Dostoyevsky’s 
Raskolnikov winds up feeling more shameful about his 
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crime than he had expected. But circumstances that tend to 
issue only in embarrassment that is adaptive and lacks the 
person’s own endorsement are potentially characterizeable. 
If we studied what exactly tends to prompt that determinate 
form of embarrassment, we may identify psychic costs that 
are objectively small and that would be estimated as such by 
the person in hindsight and upon reflection, but that, in the 
moment, have tremendous impact on her choice. It is those 
embarrassments that I propose to leverage as nudges.
Tieffenbach and Voigt are also right that shaming and 
stigmatizing for good purposes are hard to contain. Some people 
would take small embarrassment too seriously; others would 
stigmatize too much, or for the wrong things, or stigmatize 
the wrong people. But could not the same be said of any health 
promotion policy? Simply being offered advice drives some 
people crazy. Surely we should not refrain from any social policy 
to which some may overreact.
Tieffenbach adds that even mild embarrassment should count 
as a significant cost compared to what it helps prevent—a 
single instance of drinking a supersize soda, or a single 
smoking break. This important point goes beyond my own 
discussion and challenges the use of nudges against recurring 
individually-minor behavioral choices in general. Default 
changes to the choice architecture that impose hardly any cost 
in a single instance impose a high cumulative cost (e.g. scores of 
embarrassments, scores of default changes). This is a powerful 
challenge to the nudge framework. 
Finally, Tieffenbach points out that, being coercive, bans (in 
circumscribed geographical zones) on smoking or on selling 
supersize sodas cannot be pure nudges. But inasmuch as the 
main effect of these bans springs directly from the shame 
they elicit (and not directly from the ban), it seems fair to call 
them primarily nudges. By analogy, for Sunstein and Thaler, 
motivating people to do something by paying them handsomely 
is not nudging them; but motivating them to do it through a 
token payment is a nudge (5). Presumably, the reason is that the 
main effect of token payment on choice springs not directly from 
the desire for money but from other things, such as response 
to the message (of endorsement, say) that the token payment is 
understood to convey (14). 
Where does all that leave us on the use of shame for public 
health? It is rash to condemn every shaming in the service of 
good causes (15), but Voigt and Tieffenbach are right to remind 
us about the dangerous potential of shaming, even in the service 
of public health. If we are to use slight shaming for public health 
in the safest, most targeted way possible, the mechanics and 
triggers of embarrassment and stigma should be studied more 
carefully.
Yashar Saghai focuses on the final part of my commentary, 
where I argue that, precisely for being noncoercive, nudges 
occasionally cause deep shame. I have interpreted this to 
challenge the Principle of the Least Restrictive Alternative 
(herein PLRA), but Saghai thinks that I challenged only an 
implausible version of that principle. He points out that any 
interesting version of PLRA has an “other things being equal” 
clause. In his view, any distinctive tendency of an alternative to 
shame violates such a clause. 
I agree with Saghai that any interesting PLRA comes with such 
a clause [in fact, watch 1:18’ of (16)]. However, “other things 
being equal” refers to exogenous and/or independent factors, 
usually not to dependent ones. The shame that nudging causes 
(in certain types of situation) is a dependent variable. A proper 
“other things being equal” clause would not screen it out. 
Saghai’s own suggestion is that even an interesting PLRA remains 
wrong because “the least restrictive alternative is not always the 
easiest or least costly to implement”. But a difference in ease or in 
cost of implementation strikes me as a violation of “other things 
being equal”. He adds that “running through all the predictable 
consequences of feasible alternatives is not an easy task”, but I 
suspect that this could be resolved by distinguishing between 
objective and epistemic versions of PLRA. Such a distinction is 
unavoidable for many moral and legal principles and is not a 
special problem of PLRA.
Let me end by thanking again Voigt, Tieffenbach, and Saghai for 
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